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Abstract. 
External vertical fire spread up multi-storey buildings poses a very serious threat to the 
occupants and contents of such structures, and control and prevention of this mechanism of 
fire spread should be of a high priority in design considerations. 
This report takes a general look at the two main ways that external vertical fire spread occurs 
in multi-storey buildings and some of the solutions that have been created to try and combat 
this deadly threat to the people and property in them. 
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Introduction. 
Studies done into the mechanisms of vertical fire spread in multi-storey buildings have 
shown that a large proportion of vertical spread occurs externally via windows. 2 This spread 
is accomplished, generally, in two ways: 
- broken windows allowing flames to climb up to the next storey, breaking its 
windows and igniting the rooms contents. 
- hot gases and smoke penetrating the gap between curtain wall facades and the main 
structure of a building, due to inadequate provision of fire stopping. 
either or both of these may occur in a fire and may have disastrous consequences if not 
properly controlled. J 
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Spread Of Fire By Exterior Windows 
Actual Fire Experience 
The presence of windows in adjacent stories of a building can introduce an additional 
concern. Flames discharging from a fire on the floor below may ignite combustibles on the 
floor above. 
An extreme example1 of this is the building on the cover of this report. The fire was 
in a 31 story Andraus Building in Sao Paulo, Brazil. At 4:00pm a store employee noticed 
a fire involving combustible storage items. When he and other employees opened windows 
to operate extinguishers (and probably the 
fire with a fresh supply of air) the fire 
spread across combustible ceiling tiles. 
Fire then travelled down to the fourth 
floor internally and then up to the sixth 
and seventh floors via open stairs. On 
the north side of the building, heat bro~e 
the glass on all four floors, forming a 
fire front and exposing three to four 
floors above the seventh floor. Radiant 
heat from the flames then ignited 
combustible ceiling tiles and partitions on 
each floor. As more floors became 
involved, the flames increased in height. 
By 4:26pm, when the fire fighters 
arrived, the flames extended above the 
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roof. The total mass of the fire was 40 Figure 2
1 Elevation showing open areas and 
direction of fire spread. 
metres wide and over 95 metres high. 
On most floors of the building the combustible contents were totally consumed. However 
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the fire damage was less severe on the four top floors of the building. This was apparently 
due to the suspended non-combustible gypsum tile ceiling and less fire loading from contents. 
One major factor which seems to have been a major contributor to the large scale of the fire, 
is the combustible ceiling tiles. As the fire could have spread easily along the ceiling, each / 
floor would have been consumed by fire very quickly. 
Many people, to escape the fire 
moved to the heliport on the roof 
of the building. The heliport 
remained free of fire damage even 
though the flames extended above 
the heliport level. The fact that 
the heliport sustained no damage 
brings in the use of overhangs p· 31 H 1. p t D ~n;l 1gure e 1port arape eL(ll 
(parapets) as a means of deflecting 
flames discharging from a window. 
SLAB 
The details of the heliport parapet in Figure 2 show that the total overhang is about 1.43 
metres (59 .1 inches), which is larger than the design code requirements for most, if not all 
countries. At present the New Zealand design code requires a minimum horizontal projection 
of 600mm, the United States requires 760mm, and Australia requires 1100mm:2 (The 
figures given for the United States are for an unsprinklered building). Sweden, Canada and 
Britain however, do not have any design requirements, only recommendations. Full scale 
fire tests and information gained from actual fires have shown that barriers constructed to 
current codes will not reliably prevent vertical fire spread3 • A systematic study conducted 
in Australia4 confirmed earlier British findings that 2-ft projections over the windows cannot 
prevent the flames issuing from windows from curling back and igniting the storey above. 
It was found that projections wider that 3 to 4-ft are effective in keeping the flames away 
from the face of the building and in reducing the radiation hazard from the flames. 
The parapet on the heliport may have been an effective flame deflector, but there was no 
such deflector or even vertical spandrel between the floors in the rest of the building. Figure 
/ 
3. gives the details of the facade between the floors. From 
the drawing it is easy to see what little effect the facade 
would have had in resisting the spread of fire between 
floors. The problem is also worsened by having the 
combustibles (ceiling tiles, curtains, partitions etc) right 
next to the windows. 
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Figure 4 1 Facade Detail 
Between Floors 
Another example of fire spread between floors via exterior 
windows was the fire at the Las Vegas Hilton on February lOth, 1981. Fire spread from the 
eighth to the thirtieth storey via the exterior windows. The exterior wall contained windows 
which were recessed 457mm (18 inches) and separated vertically by 1016mm (40 inches). 
The exterior wall was a prefabricated assembly of masonry, plaster and gypsum wall board 
on steel studs. When the exterior walls were examined after the fire, the wall assembly was 
still intact indicating that the exterior walls had not contributed to the height of the flame. 
Behaviour of Exterior Flame Plumes 
The way in which a flame plume will behave 
when projecting from a window is influenced by 
many factors such as fuel loading and it's 
proximity to the opening, window dimensions 
and shape, wind direction, ventilation to room, 
overhangs above the window, and many other 
factors. 
The shape and size of a window has been found 
to significantly affect the height and direction of 
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the flame plume. Full-scale experiments Figure 5
4 Pressure Distribution in 
Buildings 
conducted in Great Britain3 showed that smaller 
windows produced higher flame plumes. It has been found that the projection of a flame 
plume from a window is more prevalent in the floors above the neutral pressure plane of a 
building. The neutral pressure plane is usually at mid-height for a building without 
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mechanical ventilation and is the height at which the internal and external pressures in the 
building are equal, but cap be lowered with the presence of mechanical ventilation or with 
/ 
winter heating. FigureA' shows a graph of pressure distribution within buildings. In the 
floors below the neutral pressure plane the flames will tend to move to the centre of the 
building, whereas on those floors above the plane the flames will tend to move to the outside 
of the building, due to the pressure differences. 
The shape and size of a window has been found to 
significantly affect the height and direction of the 
flame plume. Full-scale experiments conducted in 
Great Britain3 showed that smaller windows 
produced higher flame plumes, which tended to 
\. 
move away from the wall. (Refer Figure--5) This is 
probably due to ventilation as "fuel gases" flow out 
the window and entrain air, burning occurs in the 
plume outside the building. Also a series of eleven 
experiments, using a four storey structure were 
completed. Each room was 10 feet wide, 10 feet 
deep and eight feet high. The window sizes varied, 
but most were 3.5 feet wide by 5 feet high. After 
Figure 63 Assumed Flame Trajectory the start of a test, it would take only about 11/2 
Where Window Width is Half of minutes for the windows in the story above to break. 
Height 
In one of the experiments where glazing was from 
floor to ceiling, flames reached a height of 16 feet above the ceiling of the fire floor. Only 
4 minutes into the test with floor to ceiling glazing the curtains and hardboard trimmings had 
ignited. A significant discovery from these tests concerned the spandrel (or under-window 
panels). Although the spandrel assembly offered little fire resistance they were not 
penetrated by the fue, even when using a very high fuel loading in the fire floor. This ..;/ 
would indicate that minimal fire resistance is required by the spandrel due to the loss of 
energy in the flames to the atmosphere. 
Research done by Y okoi5 used a variety of conditions in a small scale model to determine 
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the plume trajectory in the upper stories of buildings. Using a ratio of n =2W/H (W =width 
H=height), he found that as the value of n increased, the flame flume tended to stick to the 
wall. This theory, confirmed by Yokoi later with a full scale experiment would seem to 
agree with the results of the British experiments which were completed later. This result 
shows that we can affect the direction of the flame plume. This could be quite useful, as the 
heat radiated to the floor above from the flame plume would be lessened. Using tall 
windows with a smaller width in association with flame deflectors could in theory help 
prevent fire spread between floors.(Refer Figure 6) However it must be noted that as earlier 
stated, deflectors to be effective must be at least 3ft to 4ft wide. Deflectors with an 
insufficient horizontal width may allow the flames to curl back into the face of the building, 
as is shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 73 Assumed Flame Trajectory 
with Horizontal Flame Deflector 
Figure 83 Flame Trajectory hits 
Insufficient Defleb\or Width 
/ 
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Curtain Wall Facades. 
In more recent times, due to the current trends in architecture, curtain wall facades have 
become common on many of the new multi-storey buildings being erected. The curtain wall 
concept allows the large, unsightly, structural elements of the building to be concealed behind 
a thin curtain wall facade, usually constructed from glass and light framing. This method of 
construction has created a new, potential, mechanism of vertical fire spread through 
sometimes inadequate fire stopping being provided between the curtain wall and the main 
structure. 
Figure 8 Typical Curtain 
Wall Setup. 
This new method of fire spread and its destructive potential was soon discovered through 
some major fires overseas and this also highlighted inadequacies in the current design code, 
[NZS 1900: Ch.S], inadequacies which were not envisaged before the popularisation of 
the curtain wall concept. 
Recognising this problem the Standards Association of New Zealand (SANZ) , in 1988, 
issued a recommendation in the standards magazine stating: 
"The connection between the floor and the spandrel wall is required to resist fire for 
the same period as the floor. '12 
/ 
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This recommendation was similar to the requirements established in other countries, but 
was only a recommendation and not a requirement and was open to interpretation by local 
approving authorities. 
From a life safety point of view, the fire stopping need only remain intact long enough for 
the building occupants to egress, this usually involves a time of about 15 minutes. Property 
protection may require longer fire stopping capacity, but in a fully developed fire, non fire 
rated glass will probably have broken and vertical fire spread will now be able to occur via 
windows. 
As a result of this problem being recognised, fire stopping construction methods have been 
developed2 ( See appendix ) all of which should prevent the spread of most of the hot gases 
and smoke to the next storey, some of these, however, could be improved. Use of aluminium 
detailing, as in Figures 9 , 10 and 11 ( appendix ), is undesirable because of the low 
temperatures required to distort or melt aluminium, which could lead to the failure of the fire 
stopping. Another area of concern is in the lack of detailing of the use of sealants in the fire 
stopping. This is important as sealants which burn or melt will reduce the effectiveness of 
the fire stopping, and no sealant could render the stopping ineffective. Figures 12 and 13 
( appendix ) are the most effective of the examples given, in Figure 12 the weakest point 
is probably the window, unless fire rated glass is used. 
The adoption, in the near future, of a new design code will hopefully address these 
problems in curtain wall construction, thus greatly improving the level of safety provided to J 
the occupants of the building in the event of fire. 
Sprinkler Systems. 
Of all the options available to try and prevent the vertical spread of fire in multi-storey 
buildings, perhaps the most effective action that can be taken is the installation of a sprinkler 
system. The sprinkler system is not only an effective means, in itself, of controlling the fire, 
but it also compliments the other methods of control previously discussed in the report. 
Indeed most codes have differing requirements regarding the dimensions of vertical and 
horizontal projections between windows, etc. dependant on whether a sprinkler system has 
been provided within the building. Both the buildings mentioned in the section on spread by 
windows were not equipped with sprinklers, which, if they were present, may have reduced 
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a major catastrophe to a small contained fire. 
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Conclusions. 
Because of the unpredictable nature of fire, it is virtually impossible to reliably model or 
predict how it will spread and hence how to prevent it occurring in a devastating way. 
This report has shown many methods that can be used to reduce the probability of vertical 
fire spread such as horizontal and vertical projections, window geometry, better construction 
of fire stopping etc. Also a major component of vertical fire spread is having combustibles, 
in the form of ceiling tiles, partitions and curtains, next to the window. It has been shown 
in this report that combustible ceiling tiles play a major component in vertical fire spread and .J' 
also fire spread within individual floors. Regarding design requirements, it has been found 
that most if not all countries, do not have adequate design requirements regarding vertical 
fire spread, in fact in many countries there are no specific design requirements, only 
recommendations. 
Perhaps the most effective step that can be taken in the prevention of vertical fire spread 
is the installation of a sprinkler system, which should control the size of the fire and 
dramatically reduce the chance of external vertical fire spread occurring, as it combines with 
the other passive design concepts discussed in this report. / 
Appendix. 
Examples of current Fire Stopping methods used m New Zealand. 
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